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Abstract
Adequate access to courts by minority shareholders is commonly viewed as an important
element of a good corporate governance system. Should shareholders be provided with
easy access to courts when judges are unlikely to punish opportunistic managers? It might
seem that having an extra instrument of protection is always better as long as it provides
some protection against managerial self-dealing. We present a model, which shows that
facilitating shareholder litigation in a system where courts are biased towards managers can
actually lower eﬃciency, as it can lead to either excessive litigation or excessive monitoring
of managers by shareholders. The latter eﬀect arises when litigation is very costly for the
firm, but cheap for an individual shareholder. In this case, easy litigation does not lead
to a greater reliance on the judiciary and results in more, rather than less, concentrated
ownership. This is the eﬀect of the optimal adjustment of the ownership structure to an
increase in shareholders’ willingness to bring suits when courts are manager-biased. Our
model implies that removing impediments to shareholder litigation in countries where courts
are reluctant to protect shareholders may increase the cost of corporate governance there.
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1 Introduction
Adequate access to courts by minority shareholders is commonly viewed as an important element
of a good corporate governance system. The right to the “judicial venue to challenge the
decisions of management or of the assembly” was one of the components of the shareholder
protection index (anti-director rights) in La Porta et al (1997, 1998), which has been widely
used in the empirical law and finance literature ever since. A recent empirical study by La
Porta et al (2006) examines securities laws in 49 countries and finds that facilitating private
enforcement of securities law in courts is crucial for stock market development.
Access to courts by oppressed shareholders is supposed to be good as it disciplines managers
and, in cases when misconduct happens, provides a mechanism for compensating expropriated
shareholders. As a consequence, the agency cost is reduced, and outside investors are more
willing to provide finance in the first place.
Should shareholders be provided with access to courts when judges are unlikely to protect
them from expropriation by insiders? A pro-insider bias in court decisions regarding self-dealing
transactions is not a rare phenomenon. This problem is likely to exist in developing and tran-
sition countries, where insiders sometimes even use bribery and threats to exert pressure on
judges.1 However, there is also evidence that in some developed Continental European coun-
tries courts often tolerate certain types of self-dealing by insiders. Johnson et al (2000) describe
three legal cases from Continental Europe in which expropriation of minority shareholders was
“explicitly blessed by courts”. They argue that these cases are indicative of situations in many
civil law countries. Enriques (2002), after studying a sample of decisions by Italian courts, con-
cludes that Italian judges are ineﬀective in protecting shareholders because they are incompetent
in business matters, formalistic and deferential to corporate insiders. Moreover, pursuing the
interests of shareholders, as opposed to other stakeholders, is not a prevailing principle of cor-
porate decision-making in Continental Europe and, thus, courts can sometimes support insiders
on the grounds of defending some category of stakeholders (e.g. workers).2
At the same time, Continental Europe has recently seen some reforms and initiatives aiming
to encourage shareholder suits.3 While there is little doubt that insider-biased courts cannot
1For example, Black (1998) describes a case of evident influence on court decisions by the controlling share-
holder of one of the Russian companies. His story is indicative of the situation in Russia during 1990s.
2The problem of the bias may also exist in the US. While there is no common agreement, some scholars argue
that, actually, Delaware courts are biased towards managers, especially in cases that concern takeover defences
(Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001), Subramanian (2004)).
3 In Germany, rules introduced in 2005 make it possible for shareholders, representing at least 1 percent of
shares or shares worth at least 100,000 euros, to bring a derivative suit against directors (Enriques and Volpin
(2007)). The 1998 reform in Italy introduced a derivative suit with a 5% threshold, which was further reduced to
2.5% in 2005. Moreover, contingency fees were made legal in Italy in 2006 (Enriques and Volpin (2007)). Sweden
introduced class-action suits in January 2003.
Similar reforms are being discussed and already occuring in Asia as well. For example, in Korea a class actions
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provide strong protection, it may seem that easy access to courts can partially substitute for the
“unbiasedness”, thereby restoring the eﬀectiveness of the litigation mechanism of shareholder
protection to some extent. That is, one could argue, the low cost of suing could oﬀset (at
least partially) the low probability of obtaining decent compensation and the lack of deterrence.
Regardless of how strong the bias is, easy access to courts should then improve shareholder
protection, as long as litigation provides at least some compensation for damages or some
deterrence.
Our model qualifies the view that providing shareholders with access to courts lowers the
agency cost and, consequently, reduces the need for shareholder monitoring of managers. We
argue that facilitating access to courts can both decrease and increase the cost of corporate
governance, depending on the degree of the pro-manager bias4 in courts’ decisions. We show
that, while facilitating shareholders access to courts provides an eﬃcient deterrence mechanism
under unbiased courts, it provokes either excessive litigation or excessive monitoring of managers
when courts are manager-biased; the latter eﬀect is associated with an increase in the outside (as
well as total) ownership concentration. Therefore, reforms that encourage shareholder litigation
in this situation are not just ineﬀective, but potentially harmful. Hence, our result raises
caution against introducing shareholder-friendly litigation rules without eliminating the pro-
manager bias first. Thus, our model contributes to the arguments against “cut and paste”
transplantation of legal rules from one country to another, as it illustrates that similar reforms
can have drastically diﬀerent outcomes in diﬀerent environments.5
Our analysis builds on two ideas: 1) the interdependence between shareholder monitor-
ing and shareholder litigation6 and 2) the commitment problem of shareholders who cannot
suit system took eﬀect in January 2005. Earlier on, in 1997, a minimum ownership requirement for bringing a
derivative suit was lowered from 3% to 0.01%.
4The pro-manager bias in court decisions can depend on both judges’ characteristics and the substance of
law, especially when judges are formalistic (i.e. ignoring real “rights” and “wrongs” behind the case and simply
following the letter of the law) and the law does not explicitly prohibit certain ways of self-dealing. In subsection
2.2 we will discuss this issue in more detail.
5Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003) empirically find strong evidence of the “transplant eﬀect” — laws that
have originated in a certain environment often work badly, when transplanted to other countries. There are also
a number of papers that refute the “one-size-fits-all” approach specifically in a corporate governance setting.
For example, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2004) argue, both theoretically and empirically, that no security law
may be better than a good security law that is not enforced. Therefore, simply copying a security law can
be harmful. Immordino and Pagano (2007) construct a model, which suggests that the level of optimal audit
standards is complementary to the eﬃciency of the enforcement technology. Östberg (2006), by means of a
theoretical model, argues that optimal disclosure standards are higher when shareholder protection is better,
and, thus, harmonization of disclosure standards may be harmful.
6 Interdependence between corporate governance mechanisms takes a significant part in the current debate
on convergence of corporate governance systems and desirability of legal reforms. In the “path dependence”
literature, interdependence is considered as one of the main sources of diﬀerences among the corporate gover-
nance systems (Bebchuk and Roe (1999), Bratton and McCahery (1999), Schmidt and Spindler (2002)). Due
to various complementarities (or substitutabilities) diﬀerent rules and mechanisms take roots in diﬀerent legal
and institutional environments (e.g. because of their social optimality or due to the interest group influence or,
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abstain from suing the manager. We consider ex-ante monitoring of the manager by a large
outside shareholder (the blockholder) and ex-post shareholder litigation against the manager as
substitute mechanisms of shareholder protection. Active ex-ante monitoring reduces the need
for ex-post litigation. At the same time, the possibility either to deter the manager through
the threat of litigation or to eﬀectively recover damages ex-post reduces the need for ex-ante
blockholder activism.
Our story is as follows. A manager in search of outside equity finance tries to mitigate the
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) by means of the above two mechanisms, each
of them involving a cost. Ex-ante, the manager fully internalizes the cost, associated with the
use of the mechanisms; his task is to minimize this cost subject to the investors’ break-even
condition. Given the judiciary system, the shareholders’ use of the mechanisms depends on the
ownership structure that the manager oﬀers. The judiciary system in our model is characterized
by the total cost of a lawsuit, the distribution of this cost (how much of the total cost is borne
by the initiator of the litigation) and the degree of the pro-manager bias in courts. The latter
is parametrized by the probability of finding a guilty verdict for a manager, who has benefited
at the expense of shareholders.
When courts are unbiased, a combination of a large enough managerial equity share with a
credible threat of ex-post litigation deters managerial misconduct altogether, so that litigation
does not even happen in equilibrium. In such a case, the total cost of a lawsuit for the firm
must be low enough to ensure credibility of litigation. This solution is obviously first-best as it
involves no cost. Additionally, when the procedural rules provide for sharing of the litigation
cost, the collective action problem among the shareholders in litigation is alleviated and no
outside ownership concentration is needed.
The first-best solution is not feasible, however, when courts are manager-biased. In this case,
litigation becomes ineﬀective. As a consequence, the managerial share needed to discourage
self-dealing becomes too big for the investors to break-even. Thus, the deterrence cannot be
achieved and, moreover, monitoring becomes more cost-eﬀective than the ex-post compensation
via litigation. Hence, only monitoring should be used, and outside ownership concentration is
therefore required to solve the collective action problem in monitoring. Why would easy access
to courts be harmful in this situation? Would not the parties themselves avoid the ineﬃcient
perhaps, both), thereby causing divergence in systems (“path dependence”).
In the context of legal reforms, interdependence means that the same reforms can have very diﬀerent outcomes in
diﬀerent countries. Some authors warn that one should be very careful in designing reforms, because encouraging
the use of certain mechanisms may undermine the reliance on the others (see e.g. Berglöf and Burkart (2003),
Bratton and McCahery (1999)). In addition, the eﬀects of introducing or reforming a particular mechanism
depend critically on how well it can be enforced (Berglöf and Claessens (2004)) and whether private parties’
incentives are properly shaped so that the parties will eﬃciently respond to the reforms (Bratton and McCahery
(1999)).
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mechanism and choose the eﬃcient one? The answer is: not necessarily. The crucial problem
here is the commitment problem of the shareholders, who cannot abstain from suing the manager
ex-post. We will call it the “excessive willingness to litigate” problem. If litigation is cheap for
an individual shareholder, only a suﬃciently dispersed ownership structure can discourage it.
But, in such a case, there will be a lack of monitoring and, consequently, the investors will not
provide finance in the first place.
Hence, when courts are manager-biased and barriers to litigation are low, the manager,
oﬀering the ownership structure, is faced with a tradeoﬀ between permitting litigation and
inducing excessive monitoring in order to minimize the number of occasions to sue. When
the total cost of litigation for the firm is large relative to the monitoring cost, the optimal
ownership structure is the one that induces excessive monitoring, otherwise it does not pay
to prevent litigation via more monitoring and the ownership structure is chosen to allow for
litigation. Either way, under manager-biased courts and low barriers to litigation, ineﬃciency
arises. The former case is especially interesting. It shows that making litigation cheap for an
individual shareholder does not have to result in a greater reliance on courts and may instead
lead to more monitoring, which is necessary to avoid costly litigation. More monitoring, in turn,
requires a larger blockholder’s share. In this case, the total ownership concentration increases
as well.
Thus, our model shows that providing shareholders with access to courts may lower eﬃciency
rather than mitigate the agency problem and may lead to more rather than less shareholder
monitoring of managers. The outcome of facilitating shareholder suits depends crucially on the
degree of the pro-manager bias.
Our results can be paralleled to the empirical findings of Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2003) and
Aganin and Volpin (2003). These papers look at the evolution of ownership and stock market
development over the 20th century in the UK and Italy respectively. Both studies find that
strong legal shareholder protection is not necessarily a precondition for ownership dispersion
and financial development. However, diﬀerently from our argument, their explanations are not
based on recognizing complexity of the eﬀects of a legal system. Instead, Franks, Mayer and
Rossi (2003) emphasize the role of trust, while Aganin and Volpin (2003) stress the role of state
intervention in business.7
7Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2003) document that despite little legal investor protection at the beginning of
the 20th century, the UK had an active stock market and high ownership dispersion in firms. Formal regulation
emerged only in the second half of the century; instead, the authors argue, informal relations of trust were the
driving force behind the UK financial development.
Aganin and Volpin (2003) find that, despite gradual strengthening of investor protection in Italy over the
20th century, stock market development and ownership concentration evolved non-monotonically, with a more
developed stock market at the beginning of the century than at the middle. The authors suggest that the state
intervention that started during the Great Depression played the key role in the concentration of ownership and
emergence of family firms.
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Two theoretical papers closely related to ours are Burkart and Panunzi (2006) and Stepanov
(2005). Both papers look at the link between legal protection and blockholder monitoring and
find that the eﬀect of shareholder protection on the outside ownership concentration can be both
negative and positive. The papers, however, do not examine the eﬃciency implications of law.
More importantly, they do not specify legal protection in any detailed way, modeling it simply
via a cost function of private benefit extraction.8 On the contrary, our paper disentangles the
two particular dimensions of law (court “unbiasedness” and litigation rules) and illustrates that
the eﬀects of legal protection can critically depend on what exactly is meant by “protection”.9
Both a decrease in the bias towards managers and a facilitation of shareholder suits can be
considered a rise in protection. If countries optimally choose their litigation rules our model
predicts a decline in the outside ownership concentration and the use of monitoring as the bias
disappears. At the same time, eﬃciency rises. Improving access to courts has a similar eﬀect
under unbiased courts, but can have an opposite eﬀect when courts are manager-biased. The
reason is that favorable procedural rules for litigation are not a substitute for the “unbiasedness”
of courts in the latter case. As a consequence, in this situation such rules cannot make litigation
an eﬃcient substitute for blockholder monitoring.
There are two other theory papers related to ours. Grechenig and Sekyra (2007) argue that
percentage limits (minimum ownership requirements for bringing a derivative suit) encourage
collusion between would-be litigants and managers (and discourage shareholder monitoring)
because they reduce the aggregate stake of the shareholders with whom the manager have to
collude in order to avoid being sued. Thus, contrary to our model, the authors allow for collusion
between a litigant and the manager. However, the authors do not allow for the ex-ante preventive
role of monitoring. Moreover, the ownership structure in their paper is exogenous, while in ours
it is determined in equilibrium. Gutiérrez (2001) presents a model that examines incentives for
shareholder litigation from the point of view of ex-ante eﬃciency. She studies the rationale for
liability insurance and limited liability provisions for directors and shows that such provisions
can be optimally chosen by shareholders, because they allow them to commit to ex-ante optimal
suing strategies. However, the paper does not consider the mechanism of monitoring, instead
it looks at the classical moral hazard tradeoﬀ between inducing high managerial eﬀort and
reducing managerial rent. The introduction of a costly litigation mechanism with a possibility
to contract on the outcome of litigation leads to the mentioned results.
8 In Burkart and Panunzi (2006) the eﬀect of law critically depends on which type of interdependence (com-
plementarity or substitutability) between legal protection and monitoring is exogenously assumed. In Stepanov
(2005) the threat of collusion between the manager and the blockholder determines the non-monotonic character
of the eﬀect of law.
9 It may also be worth mentioning that in Burkart and Panunzi (2006), despite an ambiguous link between
the law and outside ownership concentration, monitoring unambiguously decreases as legal protection improves,
while in our model it can go up as access to courts becomes easier under manager-biased courts.
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Our work can be also related to the vast literature on the economics of law enforcement
through litigation (see Shavell (2003) for a summary and references). One of the key focuses of
this literature is on the divergence between the private and socially desirable levels of suit and
the ways to correct this problem. In a broad sense, our paper can be viewed as an application
of this literature to the issue of shareholder litigation: we argue that shareholder litigation rules
should be designed so that the ex-post incentives to sue induce litigation that is optimal from
the ex-ante point of view. Our result can also be related to the “least-cost avoider” principle in
the law and economics literature (see e.g. Dari-Mattiacci (2003) or Landes and Posner (1987)).
Deterrence achieves managerial precaution (no self-dealing) which is the least costly option, as
long as it is consistent with the investors’ participation constraint. When courts are manager-
biased, an excessively large manager’s share is needed to induce his precaution. Consequently,
it becomes too costly in the sense of underinvestment (investors simply refuse to provide funds),
and victim precaution (shareholder monitoring) becomes the least costly option.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes the “ex-
ante eﬃcient solution”, by which we mean the solution that takes the commitment of the
shareholders to the ex-ante eﬃcient monitoring and litigation decisions for granted. Section
4 examines the conditions under which this solution can be achieved in equilibrium via the
choice of the ownership structure for diﬀerent degrees of the pro-manager bias. Furthermore,
it examines the ways of solving the “excessive willingness to litigate” problem, when courts are
manager-biased. Section 5 discusses the relation of our results to the desirability/undesirability
of reforming litigation rules under manager-biased courts. It also compares our analysis with
the related law and economics literature. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results with
respect to the model’s assumptions. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
A penniless manager raises funds from outside investors to finance his investment opportuni-
ties.10 He needs to raise at least amount I. Once the funds are raised, the manager can choose
among a number of projects, each of them bringing certain security benefits (profits) and pri-
vate benefits. An alternative interpretation is that the manager has one project that involves
certain transactions, and he can choose parties to transact with and the terms of transactions
(prices). What we want to have is that the manager’s choice can be summarized by the choice
between profit maximization and self-dealing (private benefit extraction, stealing). We assume
that self-dealing does not involve ex-post ineﬃciency, that is it is equivalent to a pure transfer
10The manager can also be interpreted as the initial owner of a firm without internal funds, who keeps operating
control after raising funds from outside investors.
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of profits from the investors to the manager.11
When the manager does not self-deal, the profit of the firm is Π > I, deterministic for
simplicity. Without loss of generality we can set Π = 1 (implying I < 1). By self-dealing the
manager can divert a fraction d of the profit. For simplicity we assume that the manager’s
choice is binary: he can either abstain from diversion or divert everything, i.e. d ∈ {0, 1}.
We will assume that all funds are raised by selling equity.12 Shareholders can use two ways
to reduce the harm from self-dealing: monitoring and litigation. The monitoring mechanism
suﬀers from the collective action problem. Therefore, this mechanism requires a large outside
shareholder (blockholder) who could bear the monitoring costs. The litigation mechanism may
or may not require ownership concentration, depending on the legal rules. How the mechanisms
are used will be clear from the game below.
2.1 The game (see also Figure 1)
t = 0. The manager chooses the ownership structure (α, β), where α is the outside
blockholder’s share and β is the manager’s share. The rest, 1− α − β, is the dispersed equity
share that will be sold to a continuum of atomistic shareholders. The manager oﬀers 1− β to
the blockholder and dispersed shareholders for at least I. The shareholders decide whether to
buy shares or not.13 The outside options of all the parties are zero for simplicity.
t = 1. The shareholders take their monitoring decision. Similarly to Pagano and Röell
(1998) or Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003), we assume that monitoring decreases private
benefit extraction. The only way in which we depart from these papers is that we make this
link stochastic. The monitoring cost is determined by parameter c. Having invested cp in
monitoring, shareholders decrease the probability that a self-dealing opportunity arises by p, for
example, by identifying some potential ways of self-dealing and blocking them (see more on the
interpretation of monitoring in infra footnote 15). Specifically, a self-dealing opportunity arises
with probability 1− p and does not arise with probability p.
We assume that due to the collective action problem the monitoring cost cannot be fully
shared among shareholders so that only the blockholder can rationally decide to monitor the
manager. We also assume that, even though monitoring decision is taken by the blockholder,
she bears δp < cp, i.e. less than the whole monitoring cost, and δ is randomly distributed on
11The same assumption can be found in Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) and Burkart and Panunzi (2006).
12Since the profit can be only either 0 or 1, our model equally allows to interpret the contract between the
investors and the manager as debt with limited liability for the manager. However, our focus is on the link
between shareholder protection mechanisms and the cost of equity financing. Hence, we assume equity financing
in the model.
13For the sake of brevity, whenever speaking about outside shareholders we will simply say “shareholders”,
meaning just the providers of finance, but not the manager, even though he may have shares in the company as
well.
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[c − ξ, c] according to the uniform distribution, where ξ ∈ (0, c). The rest, (c − δ)p, is spread
among other shareholders in proportion to their shares.14 The distribution of δ is common
knowledge ex-ante, but its actual realization is learned by the blockholder only at t = 1, prior
to her monitoring decision. Given δ, the blockholder chooses intensity of monitoring p ∈ [0, 1].
We will say that monitoring is successful (ex-post) if an opportunity to self-deal does not arise.
t = 2. A self-dealing opportunity arises with probability 1 − p, and the manager decides
whether to self-deal or not, i.e. he chooses d ∈ {0, 1}. The resulting profit is 1− d.15
t = 3. If the profit is 0, the shareholders sue the manager with probability q, which they
choose.16 Litigation involves cost k for the shareholders. With exogenous probability µ the
court rules in favor of shareholders. In this case, the whole stolen profit is paid back by the
manager to the firm. Additionally the manager has to transfer his shares to the shareholders.
These shares are distributed among shareholders proportionally to their initial shares.17 With
complementary probability 1 − µ, the court decides in favor of the manager. In this case, the
manager keeps the stolen profits, and the shareholders are left with zero.
Depending on the legal rules, the distribution of the litigation cost k among shareholders can
be diﬀerent. Similarly to monitoring, litigation can be subject to the collective action problem.
The law can provide for mechanisms to solve this problem, like a derivative or class-action suit
mechanism, and, hence, determines the distribution of k. We parametrize the extent to which
14The introduction of δ may look like an unnecessary complication — at first sight it seems easier to make
the blockholder bear all the (non-random) cost c. However, it will allow us to avoid indeterminacy in the
blockholder’s choice: due to the continuity of the distribution of δ, for any blockholder’s share, the situation
when she is indiﬀerent between monitoring and not monitoring occurs with probability zero. At the same time,
keeping c non-random ensures that the ex-ante optimal monitoring decisions do not have a state contingent
character, which greatly simplifies the model.
Actually, it is rather plausible that the blockholder shares the monitoring cost with other shareholders to some
extent. For example, audit services demanded by the blockholder may well be provided at the expence of the
company, not the blockholder. Furthermore, the success of monitoring may depend on certain voting decisions
of other shareholders at a shareholder meeting, meaning that they need to spent time on participating in voting.
15We present only one possible variant of the game. The key needed thing is that the ex-ante mechanism
(monitoring) can fail to prevent self-dealing with some probability and, in such a case, litigation can be used
ex-post. But the specific sequence of actions taken at t = 1 and t = 2 and their interpretation can be modified
in various ways without changing the essence of our model.
For example, a decision whether to search for a self-dealing opportunity or not can be explicitly included in
the manager’s strategy (in our variant of the game, once the blockholder has made her monitoring decision, a
self-dealing opportunity arises automatically with probability p).
Blockholder monitoring can be assumed to happen simultaneously with the managerial self-dealing decision
and can be alternatively interpreted as “interference” in the course of actions chosen by the manager with c being
the “interference cost”. With probability p interference is successful and self-dealing is prevented. In such a case,
cost c can include e.g. the costs of calling an extraordinary shareholder meeting and collecting proxies from small
shareholders, or the cost of convincing the board to reject the manager’s proposal.
We will simply use the term “monitoring”, though we will keep in mind the general interpretation of monitoring
as “monitoring + interference”.
16Since our focus is on the pro-manager bias, we assume the absence of “false positive errors”, i.e. when a
court finds a blameless manager guilty. Thus, when the profit is 1, shareholders have no reasons to litigate.
17Due to the transfer of the shares, the punishment has a “punitive” character. We need it to create the
“deterrence eﬀect” that will discipline the manager in some cases.
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the law provides for the cost sharing by the amount x ∈ [0, k], not shared by the shareholders,
but born solely by the litigant.18 The rest, k − x, is spread among all the outside shareholders
(including the litigant) in proportion to their shares. When x > 0, there is the same collective
action problem as with monitoring and only the blockholder can rationally decide to litigate.
When x = 0, the collective action problem disappears and any shareholder has an incentive to
bring a suit, provided that the shareholders collectively gain from litigating.
 
M = 1 – µ 
  
 
S = µ – k – cp 
q
Litigation 
d = 1t = 1 
Manager 
chooses 
α and β 
and raises I 
t = 0 
Blockholder 
chooses p 
p 
No self-dealing 
opportunity arises 
1 – p 
Self-dealing 
opportunity arises 
M = β 
Sb = α – cp 
S = (1 – β) – cp 
M = 1 
Sb = – cp 
S = – cp 
1 – q
No litigation 
d = 0
Manager
chooses 
d∈{0, 1} 
t = 2 t = 3 
pcxx)(kβ
α
β
αµSb −−−−−−= 11
Figure 1: The game. M is the manager’s payoﬀ, S is the shareholders’ payoﬀ (after
investment), Sb is the blockholder’s payoﬀ (after investment).
Of course, our model has a number of simplifying assumptions that may seem extreme at
first sight. However, our aim is to deliver the main ideas, while keeping the model as simple
as possible. First, our setup implies that zero profit provides hard evidence of managerial self-
dealing, which may look diﬃcult to reconcile with the assumption that courts may rule in favor
of managers. Technically, this problem can be resolved by allowing the profit to be zero with
a tiny probability even if the manager has not self-dealt. This tiny probability can simply be
neglected as it will only marginally aﬀect the parties’ behavior. Allowing this probability to be
18See more on the interpretation of the legal parameters in subsection 2.2 below.
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non-negligible complicates the solution considerably, as then the shareholders will sometimes
litigate even if the manager has not engaged in self-dealing. We argue in section 6 that such
modification would leave our main result unchanged and would even reinforce it.
Secondly, it would be more natural, of course, to assume that the manager can do partial
diversion, not just “all” or “nothing”. In section 6 we present a more general model in which
self-dealing is a continuous variable and argue that it produces qualitatively the same results.
2.2 Legal parameters
The parameters of the legal system are µ, k, x and c. The magnitude of µ reflects the degree of
“biasedness” of judiciary decisions towards managers, which we will call the pro-manager bias.19
It will be exogenous in our model. However, it is worthwhile to discuss its origins briefly.
In principle, both judges’ characteristics and the substance of law can aﬀect µ. Judges
can be deliberately partial, e.g. due to corruption or past business ties. Even if judges are not
systematically biased initially, the law can become biased in the process of precedents’ evolution.
It can happen when a judge takes a biased decision at some point and other judges find it too
costly to overrule the precedent (Gennaioli and Shleifer (2005)).
In civil law societies, the bias, if it exists, is more likely to stem from legal codes. If the
code is biased, courts, having to stay within the limits of the law, will be likely to make biased
rulings. A bias in the code can be an outcome of history (see e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002))
as well as of various interest groups’ influences. For example, Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue
that in political systems, favoring formation of party coalitions, firms’ controlling shareholders
are likely to cooperate with workers in order to set the law that would favor the interests of the
two constituencies at the expense of outside shareholders.
Judicial formalism can reinforce the bias of the code. If the law does not explicitly prohibit
certain ways of self-dealing, and the manager uses them, a formalistic judge will ignore real
“rights” and “wrongs” behind the case and will be unlikely to find this manager guilty (Johnson
et al (2000), Enriques (2002)).20
The magnitude of c in our framework reflects how diﬃcult it is for shareholders to obtain
information about potential ways of managerial self-dealing. In other variants of the game (see
19 Instead of the probability of favoring the manager, the bias could also be modelled via the allocation of the
burden of proof. Then the bias could be parametrized by the extent of shifting the cost k of legal action from
the shareholders to the manager, while still keeping x the cost of suing that is born solely by the initiator of
litigation. We believe such a model would produce the same principal results as ours.
20 Incompetence may also aﬀect the bias. Arguably, if a judge is simply incompetent and the disputed self-
dealing transaction does not explicitly contradict the law, his decision will more likely be biased towards the
manager. The shareholders are the injured party, to satisfy their claim the judge has to invest in understanding
the particulars of the case in order to establish whether the transaction was unfair. An incompetent judge, unable
to consider the case properly, may simply prefer to follow the letter of the law and dismiss it, thereby benefiting
the manager.
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supra footnote 15), c could also be interpreted as the cost of acquiring information about trans-
actions proposed or being implemented by the manager and, if the interpretation of interference
is used, the cost of blocking self-dealing transactions or implementing ones, preferred by share-
holders. Presumably, c is lower the stricter disclosure requirements, the more favorable proxy
rules for dissident shareholders and, perhaps, the higher the number of independent directors
on the board required by the law (the last point is arguable, though, because the evidence on
the role of independent directors is rather mixed).
Values of k and x are defined by procedural rules for bringing and pursuing lawsuits against
managers. These parameters will be exogenous for the determination of the parties’ behavior
and the ownership structure. The focus of our analysis is on the examination of the eﬀects of
these parameters on the equilibrium outcome and the determination of the optimal x and k,
given µ and c.
The value of µ will crucially aﬀect the character of the solution as well as the optimal values
of x and k. As far as the monitoring cost is concerned, we will not focus on the eﬀects of
changing c per se, because they will be rather trivial — other parameters being fixed, lowering
c will always (weakly) raise eﬃciency and (weakly) reduce reliance on litigation in equilibrium.
However, the magnitude of c will have an impact on the eﬀects of changing x and k, as we will
illustrate in subsection 4.2.
The lower x and k are, the less costly it is to bring a suit for a litigant. While k captures
the cost of litigation for shareholders as a whole, x (given k) measures the extent to which the
litigation rules solve the collective action problem. Values x and k can include both monetary
(fees to lawyers and courts) and non-monetary (time, eﬀort) components. Some rules have
mostly an eﬀect on x, while others mostly aﬀect k, or both x and k. For example, the mechanisms
of a derivative suit or a class-action suit aﬀect primarily x. Filing fees paid solely by the litigant
aﬀect mostly x as well (they change k by the same value as x in absolute terms, but by a smaller
value in relative terms). In many countries, if the litigant loses the case, he has to pay all the
costs; such a rule obviously increases expected x.21 Demand rules22 and rules, requiring support
by the shareholder meeting, also increase x (and k as well, but to a smaller extent in relative
terms). The courts’ practices of deciding the size of the attorney fees, paid by a corporation in
a derivative litigation, aﬀect k, but should not have a significant impact on x. Time needed to
pursue a lawsuit can aﬀect both k and x; its cost can be measured as forgone opportunities in
the course of litigation.
We will also consider a rule, which sets a minimum ownership requirement for bringing a
21To be rigorous, this example does not perfectly fit our model since x does not depend on the probability of
winning µ.
22Demand rules, typical of the US, require that a shareholder, who wants to sue first, ask the board to proceed
with the suit.
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lawsuit; many legal systems contain such a provision. It can be easily introduced into our game
by requiring that at t = 3 a lawsuit can be brought only by an owner of at least a certain sharebα of equity. Normally, such a rule allows for a collective suit by shareholders owning jointly at
least bα. Therefore, a shareholder with bα is not formally required, but gathering support from
other shareholders involves a cost for the initiator of litigation, i.e. it increases x (and k).
Some countries have more hurdles to shareholder litigation than others. For example, it is
often mentioned that it is much more costly and diﬃcult for an individual (especially small)
shareholder to pursue a lawsuit in Continental Europe than in the US. Section 5 will discuss
our results in relation to reforms that aim at removing hurdles to shareholder litigation.
Before moving on to the solution of the model, we introduce two restrictions on the para-
meters, which will simplify our analysis but are not essential for our conclusions.
Assumption 1. 1− c > I.
This assumption implies that monitoring is suﬃcient to satisfy the shareholders’ participa-
tion constraint, i.e. if all the shares are sold to the shareholders and monitoring occurs with
full intensity, the aggregate shareholders’ net profit is positive.
Assumption 2. k is bounded from below by k > cI.
No legal system has k = 0, as suits always take time, money and eﬀorts. Raising the lower
bound on k above cI will rule out the solution of a certain type that adds nothing essential to
our analysis.
We will look for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, which is determined by:
- a pair (α, β), an investment decision of the outside shareholders,
- a blockholder’s monitoring eﬀort, i.e. probability p,
- a manager’s decision whether to self-deal or not,
- a litigation decision in case of unsuccessful monitoring, i.e. probability q of litigation.
We will proceed as follows. First, we will assume that the shareholders can commit to the
ex-ante eﬃcient choice of monitoring and litigation and will derive the ex-ante eﬃcient p and
q, as a function of the pro-manager bias µ.
Then, given µ, we will derive conditions on x and k under which this ex-ante eﬃcient solution
achievable in the equilibrium through the choice of the ownership structure. We will discuss
the implication of these conditions for legal reforms under diﬀerent degrees of the pro-manager
bias, as well as the outcome of the game when these conditions are not satisfied.
Our eﬃciency criterion is the minimization of the aggregate expected cost of monitoring and
litigation (there are no other costs in the model). In addition to spent time and eﬀort, these
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costs partly represent transfers to lawyers, consultants and auditors. Thus, strictly speaking,
in our framework greater eﬃciency does not directly imply greater social welfare. However, one
should keep in mind that these transfers are payments for eﬀorts of lawyers, consultants and
auditors. Hence, at least as an approximation, it is reasonable to consider both the monitoring
and litigation costs deadweight losses for the society.
3 The ex-ante eﬃcient solution
We now will solve the game as if the shareholders were able to commit to the ex-ante eﬃcient
litigation and monitoring decisions. More precisely, we look for the couple (p, q), the managerial
share β, and the manager’s optimal decision about self-dealing, given q and β, such that the
aggregate expected payoﬀ of the manager and the shareholders is maximized (equivalently, the
aggregate expected loss is minimized) subject to the shareholders’ participation constraint . It
may or may not be achieved through the choice of α and β in the actual equilibrium.
Let us first solve for the managerial choice, given q and β (monitoring does not have an
eﬀect on the managerial decision — it just reduces the likelihood that a self-dealing opportunity
arises). Assume that the shareholders sue with probability q. In case a self-dealing opportunity
arises the manager’s payoﬀ from stealing at t = 2 is q[µ ·0+(1−µ) ·1]+(1−q) ·1. He compares
it with what he gets if he does not self-deal, β. Assume that when he is indiﬀerent, the manager
does not steal. Then the comparison yields that the manager is deterred from stealing if and
only if
β ≥ 1− qµ (1)
Let J = 1 if the manager steals and J = 0 otherwise. Then, the investor’s participation
constraint is
S ≡ J [p(1− β) + (1− p)q(µ− k)− cp] + (1− J)[(1− β)− cp] ≥ I (PC)
The ex-ante eﬃcient monitoring and litigation solve:
max
p,q,β
J [p+ (1− p)(1− qk)− cp] + (1− J)[1− cp]
subject to (PC) and the manager’s self-dealing decision.
This problem is equivalent to the minimization of the aggregate loss:
min
p,q,β
L ≡ J(1− p)qk + pc
subject to (PC) and the manager’s self-dealing decision.
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Obviously, the solution with deterrence and no monitoring, i.e. when J = 0 ((1) holds) and
p = 0, would be the preferred one since it involves no costs (litigation does not occur when the
manager does not steal). However, it is not always possible, as we will show below. Because
of that there will be two zones, in which the ex-ante eﬃcient solution will have a qualitatively
diﬀerent character: the “deterrence zone” and the “monitoring zone”.
Let us start from the “deterrence zone”. To achieve deterrence we need that both (1) and
(PC) hold. Under deterrence (PC) is 1− β ≥ I or
β ≤ 1− I (PCd)
The solution with deterrence will only be possible if (1) and (PCd) are jointly satisfied. We
should consider (1) for q = 1 because then the manager has the greatest freedom of choosing
his share subject to (1). Thus, deterrence is possible whenever
µ ≥ I (2)
This condition says that deterrence is achievable only if courts are suﬃciently unbiased.
Thus, under (2) the ex-ante eﬃcient solution is p∗ = 0 and any q∗ and β∗ such that (1) and
(PCd) hold.
When (2) does not hold the manager always steals 1, and the investors’ participation con-
straint is satisfied if monitoring and the net expected recovery in case of litigation make the net
investors’ payoﬀ exceed I, that is p(1− β) + (1− p)q(µ− k)− cp ≥ I. It is rather obvious that
β = 0 in the optimum, because then the participation constraint can be satisfied at the lowest
cost.23 Thus, the ex-ante eﬃcient solution is obtained from:
min
p,q
L ≡ (1− p)qk + pc
subject to: p+ (1− p)q(µ− k)− pc ≥ I (PCm)
It is rather easy to obtain that the solution (p∗, q∗) is as follows:
When the monitoring mechanism is more eﬃcient (less costly) than the litigation mechanism,
i.e. 1/c > µ/k or µ < k/c, then only monitoring should be used and its intensity must be just
enough to satisfy (PCm), which is possible due to Assumption 1. That is, p∗ = I/(1− c) < 1,
q∗ = 0, and the associated loss is L∗ = Ic/(1− c).
When the litigation mechanism is more eﬃcient than the monitoring mechanism, i.e. 1/c <
µ/k or µ > k/c, then litigation should be used as much as possible. However, when (2) does
23Simply notice that if (PC) is binding and β > 0, then the aggregate loss can be diminished via a decrease in
β and a decrease in q, if q > 0, or in p, if q = 0, without violating (PC).
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not hold, litigation alone is not enough to satisfy (PCm), µ − k < I, therefore, monitoring is
additionally needed such that (PCm) binds. That is, p∗ =
I−µ+k
1−µ+k−c , q
∗ = 1 and the associated
loss is L∗ = c+ (k−c)(1−c−I)1−µ+k−c , which is smaller than Ic/(1− c) precisely whenever µ > k/c.
Our Assumption 2 rules out the latter type of the solution. Under this assumption µ > k/c
implies µ > I, i.e. condition (2) is satisfied and, hence, when µ > k/c the solution with
deterrence is ex-ante eﬃcient.
Thus, we will have two zones with qualitatively diﬀerent types of solution. When µ < I
deterrence does not work and eﬃciency calls for (partial) monitoring p∗ = I/(1 − c) and no
litigation q∗ = 0 in case monitoring fails to prevent self-dealing. When µ ≥ I the ex-ante
eﬃcient solution is achieved by providing managers with a share in the firm that ensures the
no-stealing incentive (deterrence eﬀect).
The type of solution, ruled out by Assumption 2, does not add anything interesting to our
analysis.24 We will come back to the discussion of its meaning in subsection 4.2, infra footnote
28.
To sum up, the ex-ante eﬃcient solution is:
When µ < I, the manager self-deals (d = 1), p∗ = I/(1− c), q∗ = 0, β∗ = 0.
When µ ≥ I, the manager does not self-deal (d = 0), p∗ = 0, q∗ and β∗ are such that (1)
and (PCd) hold.
Now we will examine whether this solution can be achieved by the proper choice of α and
β and discuss what happens when it cannot.
4 The equilibrium solution
In the previous section we assumed that the shareholders can commit to choosing the ex-ante
eﬃcient p and q. The principal questions of our subsequent analysis are as follows. Can the
manager induce the ex-ante eﬃcient solution via the choice of the ownership structure? If
he cannot, which changes in the parameters (legal reforms) can help achieve it? How do the
answers to these questions depend on the court bias µ?
First of all, notice that the manager will always choose the ownership structure that maxi-
mizes the aggregate welfare (minimizes the aggregate loss) subject to the investors’ participation
constraint.25 Thus, by choosing α and β, the manager will try to induce the ex-ante eﬃcient
24 If Assumption 2 is not satisfied, a third zone appears: for k/c < µ < I, the eﬃciency calls for litigation with
preceding monitoring, as our analysis yields for µ > k/c. In this zone litigation plays only a compensatory role,
it cannot deter managerial wrongs but is more eﬃcient in providing shareholders with an adequate return than
monitoring. Having this zone complicates the analysis but does not contribute to the main points of our paper
(see infra footnote 28). Therefore, we have decided to eliminate it by Assumption 2.
25Simply notice that the utilities of the parties are transferable in our model.
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values of p and q if possible. The choice of p by the blockholder will be stochastic, because it
will depend on the realization of δ. However, it does not matter from the ex-ante point of view,
because at t = 0 only expected p matters for ex-ante eﬃciency (i.e. the ex-ante probability that
a self-dealing opportunity arises). Therefore, with a slight abuse of notation, in our subsequent
analysis we will speak about inducing the optimal expected monitoring.
We will separately consider the two familiar zones: the monitoring zone, µ < I, and the
deterrence zone, µ ≥ I. We will start from the deterrence zone.
4.1 Deterrence zone (µ ≥ I)
The analysis of the solution in the deterrence zone produces results that are consistent with the
widely accepted view that improving shareholder protection disciplines managers and, conse-
quently, allows companies to have less concentrated ownership.
According to (1) and (PCd), and assuming that q = 1, to achieve the ex-ante eﬃcient
solution, the manager has to keep:
1− µ ≤ β ≤ 1− I (3)
However, this is not enough. The second condition is that the threat of litigation must
be credible. The condition for this is that a litigant’s payoﬀ from suing at t = 3 is higher
than the cost she bears. An arbitrary shareholder with share γ gets 0, if nobody litigates and
γ
1−β (µ− k + x) − x if she litigates, since she bears x plus the part
γ
1−β (k − x) of the common
component of the cost and receives her fraction of the manager’s share, γ1−β , in case of successful
litigation. For any atomistic shareholder, γ is essentially zero. In this way, if x > 0 only the
blockholder can have an incentive to litigate and, assuming no litigation in case of indiﬀerence,
she will do so whenever α1−β (µ− k + x)− x > 0 or
α >
x(1− β)
µ− k + x (4)
Obviously, 1−α must be no less than β (α+β ≤ 1). Together with condition (4), it implies
that
k < µ, (5)
which is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium solution with deterrence.
That is, there exist β ∈ [1− µ, 1− I] and α ∈
³
x(1−β)
µ−k+x , 1− β
i
, such that the manager is
deterred from self-dealing and the investors break-even if and only if (5) is satisfied. Thus, when
courts are suﬃciently unbiased (µ ≥ I) deterrence works only if the total cost of litigation is
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small enough.26
While x does not enter condition (5), it aﬀects the litigation decision for given α and β, as
seen from (4). The smaller x is, the smaller α and β are needed to ensure litigation (for any
fixed β, smaller α becomes enough and vise versa). It means that if, for some reasons beyond
the scope of our model (such as liquidity, risk-aversion, or the blockholder’s wealth constraints),
lower ownership concentration is preferred, then lowering x helps to achieve it. Reducing k has
the same eﬀect.
If (5) does not hold, the ineﬃciency unambiguously arises. Deterrence does not work and
monitoring is needed to ensure that the investors get their money back. A positive block is
obviously required to induce monitoring (it is straightforward to see that a positive expected p
requires at least α ≥ c− ξ, otherwise the return to the blockholder from monitoring is negative
for any realization of δ).
The above analysis can be summarized in a proposition:
Proposition 1 When courts are suﬃciently unbiased (µ ≥ I), facilitating shareholder access
to courts makes deterrence more likely to work, which reduces the aggregate cost of corporate
governance. Thus, removing barriers to litigation raises eﬃciency under unbiased courts. Fur-
thermore, the lower these barriers, the lower ownership concetration (both total and outside) is
needed to ensure deterrence.
These results are consistent with both the view that better shareholder protection is bene-
ficial because it has a disciplining eﬀect on managers (Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), La Porta
et al (2002)) and the view that outside blockholders are a substitute for legal protection (the
latter point has been informally made in various papers, see e.g. Berglöf and von Thadden
(2000), Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) obtain this result in a
theoretical model).
Proposition 1 alone does not present a novelty in the literature. The value added of our
analysis will be in the contrast between the results of the next subsection and Proposition 1. We
will show now that the eﬀects of litigation rules change radically, when the courts are suﬃciently
biased towards managers.
4.2 Monitoring zone (µ < I)
In this zone, courts are no longer able to provide deterrence, which means that the manager will
self-deal at t = 2 whenever there is a self-dealing opportunity. To achieve the ex-ante eﬃciency,
26Condition (5) just sets an upper bound and does not provide a specific value of k. In a more general model,
where even in the absence of self-dealing suits can still occur, the eﬃcient deterrence solution would call for a
precise value of k — the smallest possible one, i.e. k, in order to minimize the total expected cost of suits.
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litigation has to be discouraged and expected monitoring intensity p∗ = I/(1 − c) has to be
induced. Obviously, β has to be set at 0, otherwise p∗ = I/(1− c) is not enough to satisfy the
investor’s participation constraint.
We are going to show that the ex-ante eﬃcient solution can only be achieved, when the bar-
riers to litigation are high enough. Otherwise, either excessive litigation or excessive monitoring
occurs in equilibrium, the latter eﬀect being associated with an increase in the blockholder’s
share. Which of the two eﬀects will arise depends on the relative magnitudes of the total
litigation cost k and the monitoring cost c.
Assume that a self-dealing opportunity arose at t = 2 and consider period t = 3. The
condition for litigation is (4) with β = 0. Then the blockholder’s expected payoﬀ at the
beginning of t = 1 is
Sb = pα+ (1− p)max{q[α(µ− k + x)− x], 0}− δp =
= p(α− δ −max{q[α(µ− k + x)− x], 0}) + max{q[α(µ− k + x)− x], 0}
Taking into account (4), the choice of p and q depends on α and is determined by the
following shareholders’ decision rule:
1) α > x/(µ− k + x). In such a case, q = 1.
if α >
δ − x
1− µ+ k − x, then p = 1,
if α <
δ − x
1− µ+ k − x, then p = 0,
if α =
δ − x
1− µ+ k − x, then p ∈ [0, 1]
2) α ≤ x/(µ− k + x). In such a case, q = 0 (assuming no suing in case of indiﬀerence).
if α > δ, then p = 1,
if α < δ, then p = 0,
if α = δ, then p ∈ [0, 1]
Recalling that the manager maximizes the aggregate welfare (minimizes the aggregate loss)
subject to the investors’ participation constraint, the manager’s problem for finding the optimal
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ownership structure can be written as
min
p,q
L ≡ (1− p)qk + pc
subject to:
- the shareholders’ decision rule (above),
- and p+ (1− p)q(µ− k)− cp ≥ I (PCm)
This problem looks like the problem for finding the ex-ante eﬃcient solution, except that one
more constraint, the shareholders’ decision rule, is added. We are interested in the question as to
whether the ex-ante eﬃcient solution can be replicated under this additional constraint. First,
we need that the shareholders do not litigate — the corresponding condition is α ≤ x/(µ−k+x)
(i.e. opposite to (4) with β = 0). Then, according to the shareholders’ decision rule, monitoring
occurs whenever α ≥ δ. Since δ is distributed uniformly on [c − ξ, c], in order to induce the
ex-ante eﬃcient monitoring intensity p∗ in expectation, we need (α − c + ξ)/ξ = p∗, which
implies α∗ = p∗ξ + c − ξ = Iξ+(1−c)(c−ξ)1−c . Thus, in order to achieve the ex-ante eﬃciency we
need:
Iξ + (1− c)(c− ξ)
1− c ≤
x
µ− k + x (6)
or
x ≥
(µ− k)( I1−cξ + c− ξ)
1− ( I1−cξ + c− ξ)
≡ xm(k) (7)
It can be easily shown that for µ < I, there always exists x < k such that (7) is satisfied
(it is suﬃcient to check this condition for µ = I). This inequality can be also written as a
condition on k, given x: k ≥ µ− x[1−(
I
1−c ξ+c−ξ)]
I
1−c ξ+c−ξ
≡ km(x). As we can see, condition (7) holds
when barriers to litigation, i.e. x and/or k, are high enough.
When (7) does not hold there arises a problem, which can be called “excessive willingness to
litigate”: the block that induces ex-ante eﬃcient monitoring under no litigation is too large to
abstain from litigation. As we will see, depending on the magnitude of k with respect to c, the
response to this problem will be either allowing for excessive litigation27 or inducing excessive
monitoring. Either way, the ex-ante eﬃcient solution is not achieved. Let us state now the key
proposition of our paper and then discuss it in detail.
27Saying “excessive” is equivalent to saying “positive” in our model. Any positive probability of a suit, occurring
in equilibrium, is excessive with respect to the second-best. The word “excessive” emphasizes the ineﬃciency of
the solution.
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Proposition 2 When courts are suﬃciently manager-biased (µ < I), then:
1) If barriers to litigation are low (i.e. if condition (7) is violated), there arises excessive
litigation (excessive monitoring) with respect to the ex-ante eﬃcient solution, when the total
cost k of pursuing a lawsuit is lower (higher) than the cost of monitoring c; thus, high barriers
to litigation are necessary to achieve the ex-ante eﬃcient choice of the corporate governance
mechanisms under manager-biased courts.
2) If barriers to litigation are low and k > c, the outside ownership concentration is higher than
in the case when barriers to litigation are high (i.e. when condition (7) holds).
Proof. See the appendix.
Raising x and/or k makes litigation less attractive for a litigant. When x and/or k are
suﬃciently high, so that (7) is satisfied, suing becomes completely unattractive. In this case,
the “excessive willingness to litigate” problem is solved and the ex-ante eﬃcient solution is
achieved in the equilibrium. Figure 2 provides a graphical interpretation of Proposition 2.
The grey area is the ineﬃciency zone; it is bounded by condition (7), taken as an equality
(x = xm(k)), the lower bound k on k, and the horizontal axis. Assumption 2, k > cI, under
µ < I implies k > µc. Depending on whether k < c or k > c, lowering x below the line xm(k)
results in either excessive litigation or excessive monitoring.
The eﬀect of lowering k for given x is more complicated. If k < c and for suﬃciently small x,
e.g. x = x0, lowering k aﬀects eﬃciency non-monotonically. Starting from the ex-ante eﬃciency
zone and moving along the line x = x0 to the left, eﬃciency drops as we cross xm(k) line, and the
aggregate loss stays constant (L = c) in the whole excessive monitoring zone. However, crossing
the point, at which k = c, by moving further to the left allows a switch to a less costly solution
— excessive litigation, and the aggregate loss (L = c+ (k−c)(1−c−I)1−µ+k−c < c) decreases gradually until
k = k. Still, even for k = k, the ex-ante eﬃcient solution is not achieved in the equilibrium
(L = c+ (k−c)(1−c−I)1−µ+k−c > Ic/(1− c) ≡ L∗).28
28One could think that it is Assumption 2 that prevents the achievement of a better than our ex-ante eﬃcient
solution with monitoring by lowering the litigation cost below µc. It is true, but only partly. If k could be below
cI, the third zone would appear in our analysis, k/c < µ < I, where the ex-ante eﬃciency would call for litigation
with probability one with preceding monitoring, needed to satisfy the participation constraint (see the end of
section 3 and supra footnote 24). Though litigation would provide no deterrence, it would have a compensatory
function.
However, for any k > 0, there is µ such that k > µc. Thus, the zone of our primary interest, the monitoring
zone (i.e. the zone with biased enough courts, µ < k/c, where the ex-ante eﬃciency calls only for monitoring)
always exists, and all the reasoning of this section holds there.
For the third zone, described above, the eﬃciency implication in terms of k would be to make the total litigation
cost as small as possible, i.e. lower it to k. The magnitude of x would have to be set small enough in order to
ensure suing by a blockholder with the share that induces monitoring, optimal for this zone, p∗ = I−µ+k
1−µ+k−c (see
the end of section 3). Thus, overall, the implications for this zone would have the same spirit as those for the
deterrence zone — lowering barriers to litigation is good (not harmful, at least). Thus, this zone is of little interest
for us and eliminating it by Assumption 2 does not qualitatively change our analysis.
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Figure 2: Graphical interpretation.
It is widely believed that improving shareholder protection is desirable. Removing hurdles
to shareholder litigation is often considered a rise in shareholder protection. However, we have
shown that, when courts are biased towards managers, providing a shareholder with easy access
to judicial review is not a substitute for the “unbiasedness” of courts. Quite the contrary, such
a reform, corresponding to a decrease in x or/and k, brings about an adverse eﬀect, as it leads
to either excessive litigation or excessive monitoring.
Which of the two eﬀects will arise in the equilibrium depends on the relative magnitudes of
the monitoring and litigation costs. If the total litigation cost is small relative to the monitoring
cost, it does not pay to prevent litigation via more monitoring. Therefore, in this case, the
manager chooses to allow for litigation, and monitoring is only needed to satisfy the investors’
participation constraint. Imagine, however, that, in addition to being manager-biased, courts
have a lengthy and cumbersome procedure that costs quite a lot to the firm in terms of time
and money (e.g. lawyer fees), but an individual shareholder bears just a small fraction of this
cost, so that she cannot avoid suing. Then the excessive monitoring solution is chosen in order
to avoid high litigation costs, provided that monitoring itself is not too costly. In the latter
case, in order to induce high monitoring, the firm reacts to easy suits by an increase in the
outside ownership concentration. Thus, when courts are manager-biased and the aggregate cost
of litigation is high relative to the monitoring cost, easy access to courts leads neither to higher
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reliance on the judiciary nor to greater dispersion of ownership.
Apart from raising the magnitudes of x and k, there is another way to discourage litigation,
namely, a minimal ownership requirement for bringing a suit. Assume that only a shareholder
with a share larger than bα can bring a suit, where bα > Iξ+(1−c)(c−ξ)1−c . Then providing the
blockholder with α = Iξ+(1−c)(c−ξ)1−c cannot trigger litigation and the blockholder’s problem
becomes like the one when α < x/(µ− k+x). Hence, the ex-ante eﬃcient expected monitoring
will be achieved. This result is in line with Proposition 2 as well.29
4.3 Empirical implications
To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that either look at the eﬀects of litigation re-
forms on the choice of ownership structures or compare ownership structures in countries with
diﬀerent litigation rules and court characteristics. Therefore, formulating testable hypotheses
would be already an important step in this direction. The hypotheses below are essentially
a rewording of our propositions. Since it is diﬃcult to obtain a direct measure for the moni-
toring intensity, we formulate them with respect to ownership concentration, rather then the
monitoring intensity.
All other things being equal, the following regularities should be observed:
• when the pro-manager bias is low, lower barriers to bringing suits against managers should
be associated with lower ownership concentration.
• when the pro-manager bias is high, lower barriers to bringing suits against managers
should be associated with:
- higher frequency of shareholder suits if the cost of litigation for the company is low,
- higher ownership concentration and little change in the frequency of shareholder suits if
the cost of litigation for the company is high.
We should note that our predictions have an equilibrium character. Therefore, they may be
inconsistent with a short run reaction on a litigation reform of already established companies
with little need for external funds. In such firms, existing ownership structures can be quite
29Our model is not meant to explain how high exactly the barriers to litigation must be when courts are biased.
According to our analysis, shareholder suits can simply be entirely prohibited. That seems the simplest solution
for a country with manager-biased courts. However, we do not observe such extreme laws in reality. We realize
that there may well be reasons against setting too high obstacles to shareholder suits. Some litigation can well
be optimal for reasons beyond the scope of our model. For example, if we assumed diﬀerent µ or k for diﬀerent
firms in a country, with low µ or k for some firms, too high barriers would, probably, be suboptimal. In our
model, we just provide a reason why lowering these barriers can be dangerous.
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rigid, therefore the most likely reaction to facilitating suits would be an increase in their number,
independently of the total cost of litigation.30 One should keep this in mind when selecting the
data and designing empirical tests.31
In the next section we are going to discuss the implication of our results to potential eﬀects
of litigation reforms in and speak about the relation of our model to the economics of law
literature.
5 Discussion
Our main result is that the eﬀects of facilitating shareholder litigation on the eﬃciency of a
firm’s governance, the choice of ownership structure and the corporate governance mechanisms
crucially depend on how biased the courts are towards managers. At the same time, if coun-
tries choose their litigation rules eﬃciently, our model is consistent with the view that better
shareholder protection (smaller bias) leads to less monitoring and lower outside ownership con-
centration (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003)). Thus, our model illustrates that speaking
about the eﬀects of shareholder protection “in general” can be too simplistic, as changing share-
holder protection along diﬀerent dimensions of law can produce strikingly diﬀerent outcomes.
Our framework helps to analyze the potential eﬀects of litigation reform. There are certainly
places in the world where courts are deferential towards insiders. Many commentators agree
that this problem seems to be present in developing and transition countries, where insiders
sometimes even use bribery and threats to exert pressure on judges (see supra footnote 1).
However, there is also evidence that in some developed Continental European countries, courts
often tolerate certain types of self-dealing by insiders (Johnson et al (2000), Enriques (2002)).
Moreover, the interests of stakeholders, other than shareholders, traditionally weigh significantly
in business decisions in Continental Europe (e.g. in Germany insiders must take into account
the interests of various stakeholders) and, therefore, a court is likely to defend the manager if
the disputed transaction can be justified on such grounds. In terms of our model it implies low
µ. At the same time, many observers note that hurdles to shareholder litigation are considerable
in Continental Europe. Unsurprisingly, a shareholder suit has been a rare phenomenon there
relative to the US, where litigation is relatively easy. Instead, monitoring by blockholders has
prevailed and their holdings have been much larger than those of their US or UK counterparts
(see e.g. Barca and Becht (2001)).
We do not claim that Continental European courts are “worse” than, say, US ones. The
30 In fact such result was empirically documented by West (2001) for Japan, see infra footnote 33.
31There is an obvious problem of measuring the pro-manager bias in a given country. One way to do it, is to
look at the sample of court cases and the stock price reaction to filing a case and the final ruling. This information
can help figure out the degree of the bias.
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US system is often accused of an excessive litigation.32 Moreover, some scholars argue that in
Delaware, where more than half of all American publicly traded companies are incorporated,
courts exhibit a pro-manager bias in cases that concern takeover defences (Bebchuk and Ferrell
(2001), Subramanian (2004)).
Our paper just comes up with a caution that any initiative that aims to encourage share-
holder litigation should be carefully scrutinized — as our model suggests, such a reform can
bring about ineﬃciency. In recent years there has been a tendency towards facilitating access
to courts for minority shareholders in Europe and Asia. Specific examples include the recent
reforms in Germany, Italy, Sweden and Korea (see supra footnote 3). But is promoting share-
holder litigation there necessarily desirable? The problem is that, even if the barriers to suing
managers disappear, the pro-manager bias, if there is any, will still be present. As our model
shows, procedural rules that favor suing cannot substitute for the court “unbiasedness” and
may result in an ineﬃcient outcome.33
We do not want to say that shareholder recourse to courts can never be made an eﬃcient
mechanism in countries with manager-biased courts. We simply argue that before encouraging
shareholder suits the pro-manager bias should be eliminated. The way to do it is either through
proper changes in the law statutes or via correcting judges’ incentives. A detailed discussion of
possible legal reforms is, however, outside the scope of this paper. Overall, our results support
the view (Berglöf and Claessens (2004), Pistor and Xu (2002)) that complementary reforms are
important to make the litigation mechanism work eﬃciently.
In the introduction we mentioned the relation of our model to the law and economics lit-
erature that seeks for conditions inducing optimal litigation incentives and optimal precaution
32Frequent occurrence of shareholder suits “without merit” in the US has raised suspicions that the US system
suﬀers from excessive litigation. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which raised the burden
of proof for plaintiﬀs in securities litigation, was actually meant to reduce the occurrence of such suits.
On the one hand, frivolous litigation may indeed pose a problem. For example, it has been empirically shown
that many suits in the US are nuisance or frivolous in character and on average do not create significant value for
shareholders, with attorneys being the principal beneficiaries of litigation (see e.g. Romano (1991), see also the
survey of empirical studies on corporate law by Bhagat and Romano (2002)). Roughly speaking, their occurrence
can be explained by the mixture of various attorneys’ incentives and a low cost of suing for an individual
shareholder.
On the other hand, if shareholder suits in the US have little to do with serious expropriation of shareholders by
managers, then it is possible that the US system can indeed eﬀectively deter managers. Anyway, suboptimality
of shareholder litigation rules in the US is debatable. The cost of frivolous litigation may be an unavoidable
side-eﬀect of ensuring the ex-ante eﬃcient deterrence.
The problems of frivolous litigation are beyond the scope of our paper. However, introducing the possibility of
suits in situations, when the manager has not engaged in self-dealing, would not qualitatively aﬀect our results,
as we argue in section 6.
33Another example is the 1993 reform in Japan, which lowered the filing fee. An empirical study by West
(2000) documents a remarkable rise in the number of derivative suits in Japan after the reform. However, the
paper finds that, on average, shareholders have benefited very little from litigation. Though we do not know
whether Japanese courts are manager-biased or not, this finding suggests that the reform might have actually
been ineﬃcient.
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(by either injurer or victim) in a costly legal system. Though this literature is huge (see e.g.
Shavell (2003), Dari-Mattiacci (2003) for summaries and references), we can identify a couple of
important diﬀerences between our model and this literature, arising from the specificities of our
setup. These diﬀerences stem from the fact that the manager (the injurer) and the shareholders
(the victims) have contractual relationships, something that does not normally exist in law and
economics papers.
The first diﬀerence is the presence of the investors’ (victims’) participation constraint, the
satisfaction of which creates value (investment is needed to produce). The requirement to meet
this constraint changes the notion of the cost of avoidance34 (or precaution) by the injurer due
to introducing an underinvestment consideration. On the one hand, simply avoiding self-dealing
is the least costly precaution, since it is costless ex-post, in contrast to monitoring. However,
the incentive not to self-deal is determined by the contract. When this incentive calls for an
excessively large managerial share (it happens when the courts are too manager-biased), the
participation constraint cannot be satisfied. Hence, in fact, the true cost of avoiding self-dealing
in such situation is underinvestment (no investment in our model). Consequently, monitoring
(victim precaution) becomes the least-cost precaution.
The second diﬀerence arises due to an endogenous contract (ownership structure) adjustment
to changes in the law in order to ensure the optimal choice of monitoring and litigation. This
adjustment is an important determinant of the choice of the mechanisms — without it, facilitating
litigation would unambiguously raise the suit frequency and discourage monitoring. Such eﬀect,
a rise in litigation and a drop in victim precaution in response to less costly lawsuits, is what
one would expect from the law and economics literature, the reason being precisely the absence
of contracting between an injurer and a victim.
6 Robustness
As we mentioned, our model has a number of simplifying assumptions. The purpose of this
section is to show that our results survive in a more general model.
6.1 Zero profit in the absence of self-dealing
Our setup implies that zero profit provides hard evidence of managerial self-dealing, which may
look diﬃcult to reconcile with the assumption that courts may rule in favor of managers. It
is more plausible to assume that the profit can be zero with some non-negligible probability
34For the notion of the “least-cost avoidance” principle see e.g. Dari-Mattiacci (2003) or Landes and Posner
(1987). Briefly put, it states that liability rules should be designed so that precaution to avoid injury is taken by
the party with the lowest cost of precaution (either injurer or victim).
26
even when the manager behaves. In this case it would be easier for a biased court to justify its
pro-managerial verdict by arguing that the manager was simply unlucky.
We assume that the shareholders observe only the realization of the profit but not the
manager’s behavior. Then, there arises a possibility for suits “without merit”, i.e. suits when
the manager has done nothing wrong but the profit is zero. We still assume the absence of false
positive errors, meaning that even if the profit is zero but the manager behaved, a court cannot
rule against him.
In this setting, the solution with perfect deterrence cannot be achieved in the subgame-
perfect equilibrium. Indeed, deterrence requires that the shareholders sue with a positive prob-
ability when they observe zero profit. Assume the manager is totally deterred from self-dealing
by such shareholders’ behavior. But then, suing after observing zero profit is irrational, since
the shareholders know that the manager has behaved.
Nevertheless, an equilibrium with partial deterrence is possible. That is, the manager ab-
stains from self-dealing with probability strictly between zero and one. Since the manager
misbehaves with a positive probability, a prospective litigant may find it rational to file a suit.
In such equilibrium the manager must be indiﬀerent between self-dealing and behaving, while
the litigant’s share has to be suﬃciently large or/and the cost of a suit for him has to be suﬃ-
ciently low so that he decides to sue despite the fact that the manager may have done nothing
wrong.35
The partial deterrence equilibrium will inevitably result in some actual litigation. Moreover,
in such equilibrium, some monitoring will take place as well, unless the blockholder’s share is
zero, since the blockholder will want to prevent some unavoidable losses he will suﬀer due to
the self-dealing and subsequent litigation.
However, the characteristics of the main tradeoﬀ between litigation and monitoring would
stay the same as in our basic model. If courts are unbiased, and, provided that the probability
of zero profit in the case of no self-dealing is not too large, the partial deterrence solution will be
ex-ante eﬃcient (notice that not only deterrence but also ex-post compensation via litigation
is more eﬃcient under unbiased courts). As courts become more pro-manager biased, the
eﬃciency of litigation, either as a deterrence mechanism or as a compensation mechanism, falls
relative to monitoring, and, finally, using only monitoring becomes ex-ante eﬃcient. Then, the
same “excessive willingness to litigate” problem arises, and high barriers to litigation become
necessary to solve it.
Thus, the conclusions in this more general framework remain qualitatively the same. In fact,
the case against easy access to manager-biased courts becomes even stronger, as suits without
35 It might be the case that the litigant is indiﬀerent between suing or not in equilibrium: he sues with some
probability that makes the manager indiﬀerent between self-dealing and not.
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merit make the litigation mechanism more costly.
6.2 Continuous choice of diversion
So far, we assumed that the manager can steal either everything or nothing. Allowing for partial
diversion is more plausible, however. In this subsection, we let the manager derive any amount
of private benefits d ∈ [0, 1], where d is deterministic as before for simplicity. We still assume
that the profit can be either 0 or 1, but d aﬀects the probability ν(d) of the profit being 1.
Specifically, we assume that ν(d) = 1− d. Similarly to the basic model, we assume that upon
successful litigation, the entire value of d goes to the shareholders, while if a court rules in favor
of the manager, the shareholders are left with zero profit and the manager keeps his d.
The solution of the model involves rather complicated derivations. However, we do not need
to search for the complete solution. For our purposes, it is suﬃcient to show that under too
biased courts, the litigation should be prevented. To simplify matters, we are going to look
for the values of the parameters under which it is impossible to avoid full diversion (d = 1) in
equilibrium. In this range of parameters, we can apply our basic analysis for the monitoring
zone without any changes.
Lemma 1 There exist bµ such that for all µ < bµ, d = 1 in any equilibrium in which the manager
raises funds.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¥
Given d = 1, for µ < min{bµ, k/c} the ex-ante eﬃcient solution will be p∗ = I/(1−c), q∗ = 0,
β∗ = 0, exactly as in our basic analysis for µ < I. Rather obviously, for µ < min{bµ, k/c},
all the reasoning and the derivations of subsection 4.2 apply without changes. Hence, for
µ < min{bµ, k/c} the conclusions of the model are the same as those of subsection 4.2.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that promoting shareholder recourse to courts generates qualitatively diﬀerent
outcomes under unbiased and manager-biased courts. When courts are unbiased, facilitating
lawsuits against managers helps to deter managerial misconduct. However, when courts are
manager-biased, encouraging litigation, instead of mitigating the agency problem, increases
the cost of corporate governance. Even though access to the judicial review of self-dealing
transactions provides an additional mechanism of protection ex-post, under manager-biased
courts this mechanism is less eﬃcient than the substitute mechanism of monitoring. The lack
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of commitment to abstain from suing prevents the eﬃcient mechanism selection and ultimately
results in either excessive litigation or excessive monitoring.
Thus, our analysis suggests that any reform that aims to improve the litigation mechanism
of shareholder protection should take into consideration the general characteristics of the legal
system in a country, in particular, how willing and able the courts are to take decisions that are
unbiased towards managers. When these qualities of the courts are initially low, any reform that
provides shareholders with easy access to courts should be preceded (or, at least, accompanied)
by reforms that eliminate the pro-manager bias in court decisions. Otherwise, encouraging
litigation would not only be ineﬀective, it would be potentially harmful.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2.
That high barriers to litigation are necessary to achieve ex-ante eﬃciency under manager-
biased courts is simply a verbal restatement of condition (7). Let us prove now the statement
about excessive litigation and excessive monitoring. For simplicity, we will keep our assumption
that the blockholder does not sue in case of indiﬀerence, i.e. when α = x/(µ− k+ x) (allowing
the blockholder to randomize does not change the essence of the analysis).
When (7) is not satisfied, i.e. x/(µ − k + x) < α∗, any α < x/(µ − k + x) triggers no
litigation and less than the ex-ante eﬃcient monitoring p∗, which is insuﬃcient for the investors’
participation. Thus, in equilibrium α must be greater than x/(µ − k + x), which implies that
litigation occurs with probability one, whenever monitoring fails.
Varying α, any monitoring intensity can be achieved. Clearly, monitoring must be at least
as high as to make (PCm) binding. Whether monitoring must be even more intensive depends
on whether k > c or vice versa. Notice that Assumption 2, k > cI, allows for both situations.
An increase in probability p by ∆ will raise the monitoring cost by ∆c, but lower the
expected litigation cost by ∆k due to a lower frequency of suing. Thus, if k < c, the optimal
ownership structure must be the one that induces the minimal possible monitoring, i.e. the one
that makes (PCm) binding. Using the result at the end of section 3, expected monitoring must
then be p = I−µ+k1−µ+k−c <
I
1−c ≡ p∗ and the associated loss is L = c+
(k−c)(1−c−I)
1−µ+k−c .
36 Thus, since
p < p∗ and q = 1, there is excessive litigation and insuﬃcient monitoring in the equilibrium
with respect to the ex-ante eﬃcient solution.
If k > c, the optimal ownership structure should induce full monitoring, i.e. p = 1 for any
realization of δ, so that no possibility for suing arises ex-post. In this case, (PCm) is strict
36We use the result of section 3 for the monitoring zone and µ > k/c. It does not matter that section 3 solves
for the ex-ante eﬃcient p and q: when q = 1, there is only one p that makes (PCm ) binding.
29
inequality, but the manager simply raises more than I, say I + y, pockets the excess funds y,
and the investors break-even anyway (the participation constraint that binds will have I + y
instead of I in the right hand side); alternatively he can retain β > 0. The associated loss is
L = c.
Regarding the second part of the proposition, the blockholder’s share must unambiguously
rise in the latter case: from the blockholder’s decision rule for α > x/(µ− k+ x) it follows that
only α ≥ c−x1−µ+k−x ensures p = 1, unconditionally on the realization of δ. When (7) does not
hold, c−x1−µ+k−x >
Iξ+(1−c)(c−ξ)
1−c ≡ α∗, hence the outside block goes up as (7) becomes violated.
Lastly, it is rather straightforward that, if (7) does not hold, setting β > 0 cannot lead to
a better outcome. Suing then becomes even more attractive for a litigant, since there is more
to grab from the manager in case of winning the case (as can be seen from (4), when β > 0,
lower α can provoke a lawsuit). Hence, even lower α is needed to discourage suits. Moreover,
whether litigation is discouraged or not, more monitoring is needed to satisfy the participation
constraint, since the total equity share of the outside shareholders is lower. Hence, the aggregate
loss will be higher if β > 0, except when k > c. In the latter case, as we have mentioned above,
a positive managerial share can be an alternative way to make the participation constraint
binding, but the equilibrium loss remains c anyway. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let Pr{profit = 1} = 1− d, where d ∈ [0, 1] is the level of diversion. First, we need to find
the best response d∗ of the manager to the probability q of litigation, given µ and β. Then, we
need to show that for small enough µ any d∗ < 1 is inconsistent with the investors’ participation
constraint.
The manager’s program is
max
d∈[0, 1]
{(1− d)[β + d] + d[q(1− µ)d+ (1− q)d]}.
The maximand can be rewritten as −µqd2 + (1 − β)d + β. Hence, using the first order
condition and accounting for the possibility of a corner solution, we obtain:
d∗ = min
½
1− β
2µq
, 1
¾
What we need now is to find a range of parameters, so that the inequality 1 − β < 2µq is
inconsistent with the investors’ participation constraint regardless of p and q. In this range d∗
will inevitably be equal to 1 in the equilibrium (if the manager succeeds to raise funds at all).
The investors’ participation constraint is:
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S ≡ p(1− β) + (1− p) [(1− d)(1− β) + dq (µd− k)]− cp ≥ I
Suppose d∗ = 1−β2µq < 1. Then, the investors’ participation constraint becomes:
S ≡ p(1− β) + (1− p)
∙µ
1− 1− β
2µq
¶
(1− β) + 1− β
2µq
q
µ
µ
1− β
2µq
− k
¶¸
− cp ≥ I
S can be rewritten as
−1− p
4µq
(1− β)2 +
µ
1− (1− p)k
2µ
¶
(1− β)− cp
We want to show that max
β∈(1− 2µq, 1], p∈[0, 1], q∈[0, 1]
S(β, p, q) < I for low enough µ. For this we
do not actually need to solve the maximization problem. Notice that for any fixed β ∈ [0, 1], p ∈
[0, 1], q ∈ [0, 1], raising µ increases (weakly) the value of S(γ, p, q). Moreover, raising µ expands
the set of β, on which the maximization is done. Hence, the maximum value of S(β, p, q)
increases (weakly) with µ as well. At the same time it is obvious that we can always find µ
small enough, so that S becomes smaller than I for any β ∈ (1− 2µq, 1], p ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, there must be a threshold bµ, below which it is impossible to have d∗ < 1 and satisfy the
investors’ participation constraint at the same time. ¥
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